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Abstract: Coffee producers typically sell raw coffee beans as the first step in a global value chain. 
Recently, groups of producers have formed coffee cooperatives that attempt to regain market power by 
integrating the other steps of the value chain. This study uses matching to estimate the effect of membership 
in one such cooperative on the household economy of indigenous coffee producers in the state of Chiapas, 
Mexico. It contributes to the literature by considering new determinants of participation and outcomes of 
interest. First, social capital at the individual and village level is correlated with cooperative membership more 
than other demographic factors. Second, cooperative members report an increase in the share of coffee sold 
and income from coffee sales but not in per-kilo price or total income. These two results reflect particular 
features of the Chiapas reality and the desires of the indigenous people the cooperative serves. Thus, they 
reiterate the importance for economic development projects to consider the context of their interventions. 
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1. Introduction 
Coffee is the second most traded commodity in the world after oil and illegal drugs. 
Because of the tropical climate in which the coffee bean grows best, smallholder coffee 
producers in the developing world grow most of the world’s coffee, which is then processed 
and consumed in the developed world. Of the 25 million coffee farmer families in the world, 
70% own less than 10 hectares than land. Since the breakdown of the International Coffee 
Agreement in 1989, these farmers have suffered adversely from the volatility of coffee prices. 
The price of green coffee beans has swung wildly from year to year, changing by as much as 
a factor of six (Fridell 2014). Figure 1 shows the world price per kilo of Arabica coffee in 
USD, before and after the collapse of the ICA. Figure 2 shows the steadily increasing 
volume of coffee exports.  
In addition to the volatility of coffee prices, though the price and popularity of 
specialized coffee drinks has increased in recent years, coffee farmers’ share of the overall 
revenue from finished products, whether roasted beans or lattes, continues to decrease. 
Recent literature calls this phenomenon “the coffee paradox.” Not only do transnational 
coffee roasters and retailers manage to earn a profit in both boom and bust cycles, but they 
also capture over 80% of the rents associated with these finished products. In one extreme 
Ugandan case, coffee producers received 14 cents for a kilo of coffee that was later sold for 
$26.40 in supermarkets. In a more typical example, $2 worth of raw coffee beans sell for 
$15-$25 in a supermarket and can produce $70-$90 of specialized drinks.  
In general, coffee consuming countries lie outside the tropical belt where most of the 
world’s coffee is grown, so a separation already exists between coffee consumers and 
producers. The price premium of these drinks illustrates the importance of immaterial 
aspects of coffee production as well on top of roasting and branding, which recent literature 
terms “symbolic and in-person service quality attributes.” The rising importance of these 
immaterial aspects of production has intensified the differentiation between the product that 
producers grow and the product that consumers purchase (Daviron and Ponte 2005).  
The fair trade movement has emerged as one approach to helping coffee producers 
and other smallholder farmers. In fair trade, consumers voluntarily pay a price premium for 
products whose producers organize and meet stricter certification standards, which often 
include environmentally friendly production processes. Moreover, the price premium 
frequently funds social and educational programs that benefit the coffee producers’ 
community. Proponents of fair trade thus claim that it restores market power to 
smallholder producers, grants them a higher, more stable income, and takes steps in 
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addressing the root causes of their poverty. Recent literature on fair trade, however, has 
suggested that the certification costs absorb the cost of the price premium and negate the 
economic benefit to the producer (de Janvry, McIntosh, and Sadoulet 2015).   
This thesis evaluates a project that takes an alternate approach: vertical integration 
of the value chain from the producer side in the form of a coffee cooperative. As described 
above, the coffee value chain concentrates power in the hands of importing countries to the 
detriment of exporting countries (Fitter and Kaplinksy 2001). To address the effects of this 
imbalance in the value chain, interventions must address the structure at the value chain 
level. In one case, help from further up the supply chain stabilized a coffee producer in 
Nicaragua (Donovan et al. 2015). Another case study from Costa Rica, however, showed 
that informal relationships among coffee producers do not produce the same lasting effects 
as formally constructed value chains (Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa 2017). Thus, this 
project formally constructs a value chain related to the producer cooperative that includes 
both a coffee roasting facility that sells directly to consumers and also coffee shops 
throughout Mexico.   
Cooperatives fall under the general pattern of smallholder farmer organizations, 
which have been used in a variety of contexts in the developing world to improve 
production processes, access to inputs, and marketing for rural agricultural producers 
(Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 2009). Because of the wide variety of cooperatives, approaches, 
crops, and contexts, the literature reflects their mixed results. In one success story from 
Costa Rica, a cooperative increased coffee farmer income by encouraging coffee farmers to 
grow a specialized coffee product (organic, shade-grown, or fair trade) and providing them 
with increased market access (Wollni and Zeller 2007). On the other hand, in a 
representative year (2004), Ethiopian cooperatives nationwide could only purchase 15% of 
members’ coffee because of lack of credit (Kodama 2007). These ambiguous results show 
that to ensure their long-term success, coffee cooperatives need a multifaceted approach 
that not only provides a guaranteed market but also financial stability.  
The approach of the program that this thesis evaluates combines access to inputs 
(improved coffee plants and agricultural training), a specialized product, an international 
network of coffee shops and customers, and integration of the entire value chain. It began in 
1993, when a group of 30 smallholder coffee farmers established the Batsil Maya coffee 
cooperative, in Chiapas, Mexico. From the beginning, the cooperative not only has 
purchased green beans at a set price higher than local coffee buyers (coyotes) but also has 
included a coffee roasting plant with the capacity to produce and sell a finished product. 
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Moreover, in 2010, the coffee cooperative launched the first Capeltic coffee shop; with this 
step, the coffee cooperative controls the entire coffee value chain. At present the coffee 
roasting plant produces three metric tons of coffee per month, one of which is purchased by 
the five Capeltic coffee shops that the cooperative operates throughout Mexico. The value 
chain integration provides a guaranteed market that allows the cooperative to purchase all 
of the members’ coffee every year. Membership is open to any Mexican citizen who agrees 
to sell only to the coffee cooperative and transition to organic farming practices within 
three years.     
The state of Chiapas, Mexico, where the coffee cooperative is located, is a major 
worldwide center of coffee. In particular, Mexico ranks among the 10 countries with the 
most coffee production in the world and ranks first in the organic production of coffee. 
Among the coffee-producing states of Mexico, Chiapas is the main producer of organic, 
aromatic coffee. Despite the presence of this lucrative commodity, the domination of the 
value chain above is especially apparent here, for while 66% of coffee production is in the 
hands of indigenous communities, 75% of coffee exports are controlled by four 
multinationals. Moreover, 76% of coffee is exported as raw material, and only 1% of 
production is exported as roasted coffee. The price of the green beans is set by the 
commodity market in New York without any consideration of the indigenous families that 
produce it (“Carpeta Delegaciones Convención Internal Del Cafe” 2015; “Impactos Café” 
2012). Thus the producers themselves do not share in the profit. In 2014, the Mexican 
government ranked Chiapas as the poorest state in the nation, with 76% of residents in a 
situation of poverty: 44% in moderate poverty and 32% in extreme poverty (“Medición de 
La Pobreza, Chiapas” 2014). After Oaxaca, it contains the second highest number of 
indigenous in the country: just over a million.  
This section concludes with a brief outline of the thesis’s method and main results. 
The coffee cooperative operates within a region of five municipios (an administrative division 
like a US county) in northeastern Chiapas as one of 28 programs of the Jesuit mission of 
Bachajón, which serves the indigenous Tseltal population. Its 250 member families come 
from the 6000 families who live in this region. Over nine months, a surveying team 
administered a rural household survey to both 192 of the cooperative member families and 
434 non-member families: 302 who grow coffee and 132 that do not. The survey was based 
in large part on another major rural household survey executed in another part of Mexico, 
with an additional module on social capital (“ENHRUM” 2015).  
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Following previous studies, this thesis employs a two-stage analysis on the 
subsample of coffee growers as well as the entire sample (Mojo, Fischer, and Degefa 2017). 
The first stage examines determinants of cooperative membership. It groups potential 
covariates into three categories: household demographic characteristics, household social 
capital, and village-level social capital. In contrast to the literature, household demographic 
characteristics do not correlate significantly with the decision to join a cooperative. Social 
capital, stemming from geographic factors as well as the religious programs of the mission, 
correlates highly in both directions. The propensity to participate increases by 3% for each 
mission workshop (curso) completed, and participation by a household member in a popular 
movement is associated with 20% higher propensity to participate in the cooperative. On 
the other hand, participation by a household member in a political party is associated with a 
20% lower propensity to participate in the cooperative. Moreover, village-level capital is 
also associated with propensity to participate. The presence of a Mexican government store 
in a village is associated with a 20% lower propensity to participate, while coffee-producing 
infrastructure like a manual coffee huller or an automatic coffee huller is associated with a 
10% or 40% higher propensity to participate, respectively.  
The second stage of the analysis uses matching methods to analyze the impact of 
cooperative membership on a variety of outcomes related to the household economy of the 
members. Using the first-stage results, it constructs a logistic model of propensity to 
participate and then use propensity score matching to examine the effect of propensity to 
participate on several possible outcomes. Cooperative members do not receive a higher price 
per-kilo than non-members. Thus, the coffee cooperative does not achieve its stated 
objective. Both the per-kilo price of coffee and the propensity to participate are strongly 
correlated with the walking distance from a major population center, however. Next, it 
examines the difference between cooperative members and non-members in terms of market 
access. It finds that cooperative members sell 15% more of their coffee harvest, consume 5% 
less, and share 1% less than non-members. Moreover, cooperative members harvest 30 kilos 
more coffee per hectare.  Finally, it examines the difference between cooperative members 
and non-members in income: coffee sales, agricultural, non-agricultural, government, and 
total income. Cooperative members receive 160 pesos more per year from coffee sales. 
Cooperative members do not devote more land to coffee farming than non-members but 
they do sell more of what they produce. Overall, the rural coffee growers who tend to 
participate in the coffee cooperative live in mountainous regions with less hectares of land 
for coffee farming. 
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The results here demonstrate the importance of the consideration of the social 
context of economic development programs in selecting determinants of participation as 
well as outcomes of interest. Reflective of dominant trends in economics, the prevailing 
impact evaluation methodology tends toward relying on demographic characteristics as 
determinants of participation and measures of income at the individual or household level as 
outcomes of interest. Many parts of the developing world, however, do not share this same 
commitment to economic growth at the individual or the social level as the primary end of 
development. As a result of these differences in values, evaluations of development 
programs should utilize outcomes of interest that are valued by the participants in these 
programs, not their architects. Thus, this thesis contributes as well to the recent debate 
about the nature of economic growth and the ultimate end of development.  
Following this introduction, Section 2 of this thesis presents additional literature on 
the fair trade coffee movement, social capital, the Chiapas context, and coffee cooperatives. 
Section 3 explains the empirical strategy and sampling plan. Section 4 presents the first-
stage regression results on determinants of cooperative participation as well as the second-
stage matching results on effect of participation on outcomes of interest. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Fair Trade  
A recent article provides a critical overview of the fair trade movement (R. E. 
Dragusanu, Giovannucci, and Nunn 2014). The movement emerged in 1988, when a faith-
based NGO from the Netherlands began an initiative to ensure that smallholder producers 
in developing countries received sufficient wages. Through its use of a specific fair trade 
label, the movement aims to provide a higher and more stable livelihood for producers. In 
addition, as side benefits, it also aims to provide greater access to credit, improved labor 
conditions, effective producer organizations, and environmentally friendly production 
processes. Fair trade works through a voluntary certification process. Third-party 
organizations like Fairtrade International certify producers as compliant with the fair trade 
movement. In turn, producers can market their products as fair trade to consumers and 
charge higher prices for them. The Batsil Maya coffee cooperative that this thesis examines 
does not follow the fair trade model, because it still deals with the purchase of raw coffee 
beans. Instead, the cooperative follows a value chain reform model, which allows the coffee 
cooperative to sell finished product coffee. Nevertheless, because the value chain reform 
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model shares certain similarities with the fair trade literature, this section reviews the fair 
trade literature in detail below.  
From the perspective of economic theory, fair trade works via two mechanisms: a 
price floor and a fair trade premium. The price floor is set by a relevant organization. In the 
case of coffee, it is the International Coffee Organization. The fair trade buyer agrees to pay 
this minimum price, even in cases when the world price is lower than the minimum price. 
Ideally, the presence of a minimum price reduces the risk that growers bear. Especially 
given the recent volatility in the international price of coffee, fair trade certification has 
provided risk protection to coffee producers through the late 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Fair trade certification does not guarantee that the producer can receive a higher price for 
all fair trade certified coffee, however. Frequently, this lack of market access prevents 
smallholder producers from gaining the full benefits of fair trade. The governing board of 
Batsil Maya annually sets a purchase price for members’ beans based on the international 
price of coffee. Members are required to sell all of their coffee to the cooperative.  
In addition to the higher sales price, fair trade producers also receive a price 
premium, typically 10 or 20 cents per pound. Through a democratic process, the fair trade 
producers together decide how to spend the price premium, typically on community 
development such as schools, health clinics, crop storage facilities, etc. As a result, their 
community ties are strengthened and their communities benefit. Five years ago, the 
governing board of Batsil Maya chose to invest the surplus profits from coffee sales into a 
community bank, which grants emergency loans for unexpected expenses in the following 
categories: education, food, health, and culture. 
  Certification is a key part of the fair trade process. By providing credible 
information to the consumer, it allows the fair trade organization to differentiate its product. 
This product differentiation allows the fair trade organization to move out of a perfectly 
competitive market for a commodity like green coffee beans into one where it can market its 
improved products to discerning consumers. Andrea Podhorsky has extended models of 
international trade to incorporate fair trade certification in two ways. First, by 
incorporating a fair trade certification program administered by a worldwide certification 
body, one of her models predicts an increase in bilateral trade between the two countries 
and consumer welfare for consumers in both countries (Podhorsky 2013). Second, even if 
the certification program is too small to affect worldwide commodity prices, another of her 
models predicts a reduction in the market power of intermediaries who purchase the raw 
materials; this redistribution of income increases the wage of not only participants but also 
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non-participants in the fair trade program and thus the welfare of the entire region 
(Podhorsky 2015).  These predictions hold true empirically. Experiments with consumers in 
the United States have shown increased sales and willingness to pay higher prices for fair 
trade coffee (Hiscox, Broukhim, and Litwin 2011; Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp 2009).   
If certification leads to higher consumer demand and better sales prices, are these 
benefits passed along to the farmers themselves? The literature reveals that Fair Trade-
certified producers receive higher prices for their products, but the extent to which the Fair 
Trade certification causes the higher prices remains unclear, as does the ability for the 
certification to deal with the structural issues responsible for the poverty of the coffee 
producers. For example, a review of 469 producers in 18 cooperatives in Central America 
and Mexico reveals that certified producers receive higher per-pound prices and overall 
coffee sale revenue, but these higher prices do not improve their livelihood in broader ways, 
such as by increasing educational attainment or reducing the incidence of migration 
(Méndez et al. 2010).  In another case, a group of 228 producers in a Fair Trade cooperative 
in Nicaragua received higher prices for Fair Trade and Organic-certified coffee ($0.63 or 
$0.56 per pound respectively, in contrast to $0.40 per pound for non-certified coffee), but 
they were not able to always sell all of their coffee at the higher price. Nevertheless, all of 
the producers credited the cooperative with the higher prices, in contrast to a comparison 
group from a conventional cooperative in which only half of the members credited the 
cooperative with higher prices (C. Bacon 2005; C. M. Bacon et al. 2008). Moreover, a study 
of 1269 farmers from Nicaragua, Peru, and Guatemala revealed that in addition to higher 
prices, Fair Trade-certified producers received greater sales and higher incomes (Arnould, 
Plastina, and Ball 2009). Thus, this study will examine not only the per-pound price that 
coffee producers receive but also their market power, coffee sale income, and overall income.  
As in any impact evaluation, evaluating the impact of Fair Trade cooperatives 
requires establishing causality. Quite possibly the same factors that influence selection into 
certification could also account for the positive effects of Fair Trade certification above. 
Thus, instead of simple comparison of means between treatment and control group, recent 
literature has employed matching methods on observable characteristics. Two examples of 
matching techniques reveal mixed results. One study that used matching techniques on 327 
members of coffee cooperatives in Nicaragua found that Fair Trade-certified farmers 
obtained higher prices (Beuchelt and Zeller 2011). On the other hand, another study that 
used matching techniques on 360 coffee producers in Peru did not reveal a difference in 
price for Fair Trade-certified farmers (Ruben and Fort 2012).  
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Though Batsil Maya’s integration of the value chain differs from Fair Trade 
certification, its approach shares many of the same characteristics. It addresses the low 
prices and price volatility of raw coffee beans by offering a specialized product with more 
demanding production requirements to consumers who are willing to pay a higher price. 
These increased profits are in turn passed along to the coffee producers. Thus, this thesis 
examines the effect of participation in Batsil Maya in the same way that the literature has 
examined the effect of participation in Fair Trade certification: using matching techniques 
on observable characteristics of coffee producers across a variety of outcomes of interest.  
 The literature still lacks consensus on which variables should be used for matching. 
Age of household head, size of family, and educational attainment are exogenous. In the 
Mexican context, since land cannot be bought or sold under the ejido system, this thesis also 
considers landholding as exogenous as well. Thus it uses six demographic variables: female-
only household, age of household head, education level, number of males, number of 
children, and landholding. In addition, however, it considers other forms of social capital at 
the household and the village level that are particular to the Chiapas context.  Thus this 
literature review turns next to social capital in general and social capital in Chiapas in 
particular before finally examining literature on cooperatives.   
  
2.2  Social Capital 
 A recent literature review on social capital summarizes its basic premise: 
“relationships matter” (Coleman 2010).  Through interpersonal interactions, people build up 
community; this experience of belonging that comes from feeling oneself as a part of a 
community touches a basic human need. Moreover, this social capital undergirds social 
norms and formal institutions, two subjects that have recently emerged as areas of ongoing 
research in economic development. An emerging literature has analyzed the effect of all 
three of these elements on economic growth. Four elements have emerged that explain the 
channels by which social capital helps economic growth: 1) it encourages cooperation; 2) it 
increases the efficiency of everyday business interactions; 3) it expands individuals’ 
awareness of linkages and dependencies beyond the self; 4) it serves as a conduit for useful 
information (Putnam 2007).  
 This thesis proposes that the first and the fourth element of social capital play a 
particular role in coffee cooperatives. Through preexisting social capital, it argues 
individuals find out about the existence of the coffee cooperative in the first place. This view 
of the role of social capital as the source of information about new agricultural technology 
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aligns with other literature, such as the adoption of fertilizer by pineapple farmers in Ghana 
(Conley and Udry 2010). Moreover, in order for the coffee cooperation to function, its 
members must trust one another to engage in the collective action of processing and 
marketing the coffee together.  
Initial empirical work on social capital established a relationship between cross-
country economic growth and survey data about trust (Knack and Keefer 1997). Following 
sociological literature, this work proposed an increase in the associational life of a nation as 
a possible intervention to increase trust in countries that exhibited low levels of it. These 
associations include social welfare groups, unions, arts and cultural organizations, religious 
congregations, volunteer organizations, youth work, and community development groups. 
This thesis employs a different measure of social capital that will be discussed below: 
participation of households in mission workshops, political activism, and popular 
movements. In addition, it considers village-level proxies for social capital such as the 
presence of coffee hulling infrastructure provided by NGOs and government stores, 
meeting halls, and road improvements subsidized by the Mexican government.  
 
2.3 Three Types of Social Capital in Chiapas 
Based on the increasing recognition of the importance of social capital in economic 
development in general, this thesis will consider three important sources of social capital in 
the Chiapas context in particular: religious organizations, political organizations, and the 
Mexican government. Its results suggest that a household’s preexisting alignment with one 
of these sources is reflected in its decision to participate in the coffee cooperative and the 
subsequent effect of this participation on its household economy.  
Sociologists have studied the role of religion in creating social capital. Important 
factors include the size of the congregation, the sort of relationships (horizontal or vertical) 
that it creates, and the way that it manifests itself in terms of practical action in the 
surrounding community (Coleman 2003). In the context of this thesis, these factors would 
indicate a strong potential for the Jesuit mission. First, it spans 622 villages and five 
municipios. Second, it promotes horizontal relationships among the indigenous themselves. 
In response to the scarcity of priests, for the past forty years, it has trained local religious 
leaders, deacons and their wives, so that nearly every group or two or three villages. 
Moreover, a sophisticated system of local village jobs (cargos) that has evolved over the four 
centuries since the initial contact of the Tseltales and Catholicism at present includes 10% 
of the population of the mission and serves as a strong base of social capital (Maurer 1984).     
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  In addition, developments in the Chiapas political reality since the middle of the 20th 
century have continued to strengthen social capital. This political social capital overlaps 
with religious social capital. Since the 1950s, all across Mexico, in response in part to 
external competition from Protestant missionaries and in part to the internal dynamic of 
the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church began to strongly supported movements 
for land redistribution and indigenous rights and work not only in city centers but in rural, 
indigenous villages (Trejo 2014). In the Chiapas context in particular, a combination of 
liberation theology and political activism by groups associated with the Catholic Church 
beginning in the 1970s laid the groundwork for the 1994 Zapatista uprising (Washbrook 
2007). In the 1990s, the Zapatistas’ use of the nascent Internet created a tipping point that 
allowed them construct an inclusive social movement and successfully wage a publicity war 
against the Mexican government. Eighteen months after the successful occupation of 
250,000 hectares of land in 1994 that originally belonged to indigenous groups, the 
Mexican government agreed to purchase it and return it to them (Martinez-Torres 2001).     
The natural social capital in Chiapas has taken a variety of forms. Some of the capital 
has emerged completely from below, like the Zapatista movement and its own coffee 
cooperatives. Other strands of social capital have emerged as a result of partnerships with 
religious organizations and other NGOS who have helped local people establish the coffee 
cooperatives. Interviews with Chiapas coffee producing families have shown that both of 
these types of social capital have worked with natural capital to contribute to the success of 
Chiapas coffee cooperatives (Martinez-Torres 2006). This difference is reflected in two of 
the measures of social capital that this thesis employs: participation in political activism and 
popular movements.  
A third type of social capital also plays an important role. Since 1992, the Mexican 
government has offered a rural food store program, DICONSA, by which autonomous food 
councils in local villages open government-subsidized stores that sell staple goods. They 
represent a partnership that allows the Mexican government to utilize natural social capital, 
and their continued success has come on account of their local oversight. Most of the 22,000 
stores are in rural places like Chiapas, and independent evaluations have confirmed that 
they offer a wide variety of goods at the same or lower prices than neighboring private 
stores (Fox 2007). Nevertheless, the presence of a DICONSA store in a village is associated 
with a lower probability that a resident of that village will participate in Batsil Maya. This 
result suggests that individuals choose to align themselves with either the Mexican 
government or the Jesuit mission. 
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2.4 Coffee Cooperatives 
The cooperative movement emerged in Europe in the late 19th century in response 
to the expanding global market as a similar mechanism by which agricultural producers 
used collective action in reaction to an outside shock. By banding together, small and 
middle-sized farms gained increased access to inputs, improvement knowledge about new 
production technologies, and the ability to sell in new markets. In the case of Spain, for 
example, the management of collective resources and common lands allowed for a stock of 
natural social capital that contributed to the success of rural agricultural cooperatives 
(Tapia 2012). A century later, when the coffee crisis hit in 1989, smallholder coffee 
producers in the developing world as well tried to use coffee cooperatives to deal with the 
effect of globalization. As the introduction mentioned, the smallholder producers suffered 
from both price volatility in addition to a generally lower price for raw coffee since the 
collapse of the ICA. Figure 1 demonstrates this trend. 
In response to the coffee crisis, smallholder coffee farmers across the coffee-
producing countries have organized into coffee cooperatives. Two results from the 
microeconomic theory of the firm provide potential theoretical underpinning for the success 
of these cooperatives. First, product differentiation allows producers to move from a 
perfectly competitive market to one of monopolistic competition. This differentiation often 
takes the form of the adoption of organic, shade-grown, fair trade, or similar certification 
schemes. Moreover, it allows consumers in coffee consuming countries to express their 
preference for this certified coffee. Thus in this new market, coffee producers can retain 
some of the rents and increase their producer surplus. (Barham and Weber 2012). Second, 
in many coffee markets, the buyers function as a cartel to set higher prices; thus, when 
smallholder farmers, through collective action, sell their coffee together, they once again 
regain price maker power and increases their producer welfare (Milford 2004). In addition 
to these two insights, collective action and institutional support is thought to help 
smallholder agricultural producers share knowledge and reduce transaction costs in order 
to more effectively sell their products in international markets (Narrod et al. 2009).   
Despite the theoretical promise, the mixed success of coffee cooperatives in practice 
in improving smallholder farmers’ participation in the market motivates this thesis. A study 
of coffee farmers in Costa Rica indicates that participating in specialty market channels and 
cooperatives increases the price that farmers receive. Access to reliable price information 
about the national and world price of coffee in particular enhances the improved price 
(Wollni and Zeller 2007). Nevertheless, as the introduction discussed, in many cases the 
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additional costs of certification for the specialized coffee absorb all of the rents that the 
producers gain, leaving the net impact on producer welfare as zero.  
Three pieces of recent literature have revealed the complexity of this story by 
examining the heterogeneous benefits of cooperative membership. A study of coffee farmers 
in Ethiopia found increased income and assets for cooperative members, but substantially 
higher benefits for non-members (ATU) than for members (ATT), suggesting evidence of 
negative selection. A study of agricultural cooperative members in Rwanda found similar 
results: the income effect of cooperative membership was higher the lower the propensity to 
participate in the cooperative (Verhofstadt and Maertens 2015). Finally, a study of coffee 
cooperative members in Costa Rica found increases in income as a result of participation in 
Fair Trade certification predominantly for skilled coffee producers at times when the global 
coffee prices are lowest (R. Dragusanu and Nunn 2018). In the latter case, the fair trade 
organization redistributed income to the skilled coffee producers from the intermediary 
coffee buyers, who were members of the same community, resulting in a net social welfare 
effect of zero for the region served by the fair trade organization as a whole.  
Finally, recent literature has empirically examined the effect of social capital on 
cooperative membership. One study of four coffee cooperatives in Ethiopia found a positive 
effect of bonding (within group) social capital but a negative effect of bridging (between 
group) social capital on income. Rural coffee farmers with less opportunities for outside 
work and less influence from Western individualism tend to exhibit higher social capital in 
general and greater participation in cooperative activities (Ruben, Ruerd and Heras, Jorge 
2012).  Another study of 147 Chinese agricultural cooperatives finds a positive relationship 
between three dimensions of social capital—external networks outside the cooperative, 
internal relationships among cooperative members, and cognitive alignment with the 
cooperative mission—on both participation in meetings and training sessions as well as the 
economic performance of the cooperative.  
The present thesis contributes to the literature on cooperatives and social capital by 
employing a broader definition of social capital than individual-level surveys about trust, 
participation in religious and political programs, and by examining the relationship between 
these indicators of social capital and cooperative membership. In this way, it examines the 
effect of the broader context on a household’s selection into a particular development 
program. After all, development programs do not function in a vacuum, and organizations 
that promote them are always located somewhere in the existing social network of a region.   
 
  
 
13 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sampling and Data Collection 
A household survey was conducted in the mission of Bachajón, Chiapas, Mexico 
between August 2017 and April 2018. A full list of the indigenous villages (comunidades) 
does not exist, and at least half of them do not appear on the localities list of the Mexican 
government census (INEGI). Thus, instead of the list of villages, the sampling plan is based 
on the list of 622 village chapels (ermitas). In most cases, each chapel corresponds to exactly 
one village. In a few cases, a large village may have two chapels or two neighboring villages 
may share the same chapel. For all of those surveyed, the surveyors asked both for chapel 
and village, and as part of the data cleaning process, mission staff reviewed both lists to 
verify consistency. 
The mission is divided into 23 interzones and 60 zones in five adjacent 
municipalities: Bachajón, Chilon, Ocosingo, Sitalá, and Pantelho. The 250 members of the 
coffee cooperative are in 50 of the 622 village chapels, which fall under 20 of the 60 zones. 
Figure 3 shows the area of the mission and Figure 4 shows the sampling area. 192 of them 
were surveyed. In addition, a control group of both coffee growers and non-coffee growers 
was randomly selected using stratified random sampling: non-members of the cooperative 
who live in the same chapel, non-members of the cooperative who live in the same zone as 
cooperative members but a different chapel, and non-members of the cooperative who live 
in a zone that does not have cooperative members. This two-level approach was chosen to 
account for spillover effects (Abate, Francesconi, and Getnet 2014). On the one hand, the 
presence of cooperative members in the same zone might affect the entire market for the 
zone; the local coffee buyer would have to match the cooperative’s price even when 
purchasing the coffee of non-cooperative members. On the other hand, comparing 
cooperative members from a different zone would increase the likelihood of selection bias 
based on differences among zones. Incorporating both types of respondents in the control 
group accounts for these two concerns.  
For the second and third stage, one third of the possible units (zones and villages) 
were selected using Excel random numbers. Surveyors were instructed to survey one half of 
the households of each village that was selected. A few small zones that did not contain at 
least 10 villages were excluded. In addition, logistical difficulties prevented surveyors from 
visiting five zones: two that contained cooperative members and three that did not. Thus, 
58 members of the coffee cooperative and 100 potential members of the control group were 
not surveyed.  
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The survey contains seven modules: village characteristics, household 
characteristics, social capital, household economy, labor income, non-labor income, and debt 
level. The household economy module included questions about livestock, land, and crops, 
with detailed questions about the three principal crops: coffee, corn, and beans. The social 
capital and debt level modules were constructed with input of cooperative staff, and the 
other modules were adapted from another rural Mexican household survey (“ENHRUM” 
2015). Mission staff assisted in the translation of the survey from Spanish to Tseltal, and 
tablets were programmed with a bilingual version of the survey, to ensure that respondents 
understood the technical terms, which sometimes appeared in Tseltal using Spanish words. 
Younger respondents tended to understand the Spanish terms, while older respondents the 
Tseltal terms. Thus the survey provided both sets of terms. 
 The survey team consisted of 12 bilingual Tseltal men and women. It included 
members of the mission radio station and other mission programs who were familiar with 
the villages in the sampling area and had previous experience administering surveys. In 
addition, in some cases, members of the coffee cooperative staff surveyed coffee cooperative 
members. In the month of July, the surveyors received a day-long training workshop. 
Subsequently, the survey was piloted and revised with their input, and from August 2017 to 
April 2018, 626 households were surveyed, of which 494 respondent households were coffee 
growers and 192 respondent households were cooperative members. 
 
3.2 Analytical Frameworks and Estimation Strategies 
Retrospective program evaluations can present difficulties in terms of an 
identification strategy because of concerns about endogenity: program participation may be 
influenced by the same outcome whose treatment effects the evaluation is trying to measure. 
Even more, unobservable differences between participants and non-participants may bias 
results. As a result, researchers match units of the participant and non-participant group 
based on observable factors, all of which they consider exogenous to program participation. 
The number of observable factors, however, can result in the “curse of dimensionality,” 
which can make it difficult to find exact matches between units in the treatment and control 
groups.  Propensity score matching addresses this concern by computing an instrumental 
variable of a unit’s “propensity to participate” and matching based on this variable alone 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). 
Propensity score matching depends on three important assumptions (Heinrich, 
Maffioli, and Vázquez 2010). First, through the conditional independence assumption, after 
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controlling for the set of covariates X, the potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment status. In this way, PSM can provide an unbiased estimate like the random 
assignment in a randomized control trial. Second, through the common support assumption, 
for each set of covariates X, there is a positive probability of both being treated and 
untreated. This assumption is also known the overlap condition, because it allows PSM to 
find comparable units within the treatment and control group for every value of the 
propensity score. Third, the balancing property requires that the covariate means be the same 
after balancing to verify that PSM has successfully addressed the problem of selection on 
unobservables and that the difference in outcomes can be attributed only to participation in 
the program.  
This thesis will employ PSM in three variations: 5 nearest neighbor matching, 
radius matching, and kernel matching. These three variation provide a robustness check. 
The household survey includes a number of observable factors that are expected to 
influence a household’s propensity to participate but are not expected to influence any of the 
outcomes of interest. As section 2 indicated, these factors are classified into three groups: 
demographic characteristics, household-level indicators of social capital, and village-level 
indicators of social capital.  
 
3.3 Determinants of Cooperative Participation 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics as well as 
mean differences between treatment and control groups. The first group of demographic 
characteristics include demographic characteristics that have been employed by other 
literature on cooperative membership (Mojo, Fischer, and Degefa 2017; Elder, Zerriffi, and 
Le Billon 2012): female-only head of household; age, marital status, and education level of 
head of household; number of children and men; and total land area. In the context of the 
Mexican ejido system, land cannot be bought or sold, merely inherited, so cooperative 
membership could not influence land area. The treatment and control groups do differ on 
age, the presence of men, and marital status. These differences would imply that households 
consisting of younger, unmarried women do not participate in the coffee cooperative, 
probably owing to the labor-intensive nature of the coffee production process. Nevertheless, 
Table 3 shows that after matching the treatment and control groups are balanced.  
Table 2 contains a breakdown of the physical capital indicators at the village level 
and the social capital indicators at the individual level. The village-level physical capital 
indicators come from the community characteristics module of ENHRUM, which contains 
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27 measures of village-level physical capital. This model includes five that are hypothesized 
to potentially affect market access (the presence of dirt or paved roads), coffee production 
(the presence of a manual or automatic coffee huller), and social capital (the presence of a 
DICONSA government store or Ejido Meeting Hall). In the context of the various types of 
social capital that the previous section presented, road maintenance, the government store, 
and the meeting hall would be provided by the Mexican government, while the coffee 
production infrastructure would be provided by an NGO.  
The social capital indicators come from two sources. First, participation in political 
activism or a popular movement is asked at the individual level by the household member 
characteristics module, also from ENHRUM. The first-stage model uses a dummy variable: 
a household is considered politically active if any member reports political activism, and 
likewise for a popular movement. Second, walking distance in hours to a population center 
also comes from ENHRUM at the household level. Figure 5 presents the distribution 
across coffee growers (top) and the total sample (bottom).  
Finally, the social capital module of the survey measures both the total number of 
workshops (cursos) of the mission that household members reports participating in and the 
total number of community jobs (cargos) of household members. The two measures highly 
correlate, so the number of courses is used, because it has more variation, and reflects not 
only social capital within the village but also across the mission, since courses take place at 
the mission center (colegio) in Bachajón. The distribution of the course count suggests 
diminishing returns for additional courses, so the logged value of the variable is employed. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution, across the full sample and the subsample of coffee growers. 
As the previous section indicated, these measures serve as proxies for the natural social 
capital present in the Tseltal community. In addition, mission workshops provide 
opportunities for the information exchange that could result in a household’s decision to 
join the coffee cooperative. 
 
3.4 Outcome Variables of Interest 
Table 5 gives descriptive statistics on outcome variables of interest. The literature 
suggests that per-kilo price of coffee and total income should be considered. The stated aims 
of the cooperative as well as the value chain literature that section 2 surveyed both place a 
considerable amount of weight on the per-kilo price of coffee. As section 4 will reveal, 
however, participation in the cooperative does not affect the per-kilo price of coffee. In 
contrast, distance to the population center as well as unobservable effects at the village-
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level both correlate significantly with it. These results corroborate with the hypothesis of 
cooperative staff members that local coffee buyers (coyotes) set different prices farther away 
and at different times during the harvest season depending on the surrounding market 
access, creating “micromarkets” for the coffee. In contrast, the coffee cooperative pays the 
same price year round for any member in the geographical region of the mission.  
Following the literature, the outcomes of interest break down income into total 
agricultural income (which includes sales of corn and beans as well), non-agricultural 
income (day labor, migrant labor, and support from government programs), and 
government income (participation in one of seven Mexican government social programs). 
Non-agricultural income includes both local and non-local sources of income. Seasonal 
migration is common in this part of Mexico, and survey questions about internal and 
international migration reveal the presence of migration both to the state capital (Tuxtla 
Gutierrez), the Yucatan tourist region, and northern Mexico (Sonora), which has a different 
growing season. Only one household reported migrating to the United States.  
Government programs include the Progresa/Oportunidades program that section 2 
mentioned, as well as other assistance programs for households, unemployed, rural workers 
(PROCAMPO), the elderly, nutrition, and education. Respondents only reported receiving 
income from the first four of these categories, and this thesis aggregates their response into 
a single outcome variable of government income. In addition, it aggregates all of these 
sources of income into a single outcome variable of total income.     
In addition, this thesis also measures market access as an outcome of interest. For 
the three principal crops (corn, beans, and coffee), the survey asks for the amount harvested, 
the amount sold, the amount shared (outside the cash economy), and the amount consumed 
in the household. For the coffee data, the fraction of coffee sold, consumed, and shared is 
computed. The model here assumes that in order to maximize their income from coffee sales, 
households will sell as much of their coffee harvest as they can. The inability to sell some of 
it would indicate a market failure. Thus, these fractions (shares) are used as a measure of 
market access. In addition, standardized measures of sale and yield by hectare are computed 
in order to account for possible negative selection. Cooperative membership cannot change 
a household’s possibly sub-par landholdings but it could help it cultivate them better.  
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4. Results 
Once the balance of the sample has been verified, PSM proceeds in two stages. First, 
it uses a logit model to compute the propensity score. Section 4.1 discusses these results, 
which relate to determinants of participation in the cooperative. Next, it computes the ATT 
(Average Treatment on the Treated) on the outcome variables of interest. Section 4.2 
discusses these results, which relate to impact of cooperative participation on the household 
economy. 
 
4.1 Determinants of Participation in Cooperatives 
Table 4 shows six models of a propensity to participate function: three apiece on the 
full sample and the subsample of coffee growers. Model (1) includes only demographic 
characteristics, Model (2) incorporates household measures of social capital, and Model (3) 
incorporates village-level measures of physical and social capital. Models (4), (5), and (6) 
proceed in the same way over the subsample of coffee growers.  
 
4.1.1 Demographic Characteristics 
Many demographic characteristics have correlated with cooperative participation 
elsewhere do not exhibit correlations here. As a point of comparison for the magnitude and 
significance level of these characteristics, this section compares the Chiapas results to a 
strand of recent literature on propensity to participate in various forms of cooperatives: 
coffee cooperatives in Ethiopia (Abate, Francesconi, and Getnet 2014; Mojo, Fischer, and 
Degefa 2017; Abebaw and Haile 2013), a banana cooperative in Kenya (Fischer and Qaim 
2012), and specialized coffee marketing channels in Costa Rica (Wollni and Zeller 2007).  
In models 1/4 here, the presence of a female head of household is associated with a 
15% less likelihood of not participating in the cooperative (14% for coffee growers). In 
Ethiopia with coffee, the presence of a female accounted for 25% less. In Kenya with 
bananas, it was not significant; the authors report that bananas have traditionally been a 
women’s crop in Kenya. I attribute the increased association here to the nature of coffee 
production; though it is not a male crop per se since an entire family tends a coffee field, 
various steps of coffee cultivation and processing require physical effort.  
In Chiapas, each additional male in the household is associated with an increase in 
the likelihood of participating in the cooperative by 6% (5% for coffee growers). The 
correlation with the presence of additional men decreases in models 2/5 and 3/6, which 
consider explicitly possible activities by which these men would learn about the cooperative. 
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In addition, the correlation with a female-household decreases and loses its significance as 
well. As the subsequent section will discuss, these models consider explicitly channels by 
which men (and not women) would learn about the cooperative. Though from a young age, 
children help tend the coffee fields in Chiapas, the number of children is not correlated with 
the propensity to participate. The literature from Ethiopia did break down family members 
by age or sex: there each additional family member was associated with an increased 
propensity to participate of 6%. In Costa Rica, each additional male decreased propensity to 
participate in a specialized coffee-marketing channel by 7%. The authors above attributed 
this result to a preference among working-age men in a household for more-profitable off-
farm work nearby instead of coffee production. In the surveyed region of Chiapas, in 
contrast, non-agricultural work is not available nearby and would require internal 
migration.  
Another difference between the Chiapas cooperative and the other cooperatives is 
the relationship between education and the propensity to participate. In Ethiopia, each 
additional year of schooling of the household head is associated with an increased 
propensity to participate of 8%; in Costa Rica, the increase is 9%. The authors of these 
studies attribute their results to the fact that more experienced or more educated coffee 
producers were more likely to understand the advantages of the cooperative model and 
adopt it.  On the other hand, in Chiapas, education level of the head of household  does not 
correlate with cooperative participation. As an alternative, I tried a model that used a 
measure of informal education—literacy in Spanish and Tseltal and oral fluency in 
Spanish—instead of years of formal education; these covariates as well were not associated 
significantly with the propensity to participate.  
The Ethiopia literature finds a strong association between age of household head 
and participation in the cooperative (2% higher probability for each year). The authors 
attribute this association to the increased experience of older farmers, which helps them 
appreciate the benefit of a cooperative. In Costa Rica, each additional year of experience 
with coffee cultivation is associated with a 1% increase. In Kenya, each additional year of 
age is associated with a 3% higher probability of participation. In contrast, none of the 
models here find an association between age and participation, despite the initial mean 
difference of 6 years between the group of cooperative members and the group of non-
members.  
In addition, in Ethiopia, each additional hectare of land is associated with a 32% 
higher probability of joining the cooperative. In Kenya and Costa Rica, the increase is more 
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modest, at 4%. Here landholdings do not appear to be associated with the probability of 
joining the cooperative. I propose that the differences in the Mexican land regime and those 
elsewhere could account for this difference. As a previous section mentioned, within the 
ejido, individuals cannot buy or sell land. Overall, demographic characteristics exhibit a far 
weaker association with cooperative membership in the Chiapas case, especially in models 
2/5 and 3/6. In the latter model, in contrast with all of the literature I reviewed, no 
demographic characteristic shows a significant association with cooperative membership.  
 
4.1.2 Individual Social Capital 
Models 2/5 add the four measures of social capital that the previous section 
mentioned: the presence of a household member who participates in a popular movement, 
the presence of one who participates in political activism, the number of mission courses 
that the household has participated in the past year, and the household’s distance from the 
population center. These measures differ from additional measures that were used in 
Ethiopia: the number of coffee customers, the number of agricultural experts, and whether 
the respondent knew the current prices of coffee at the central auction. In Kenya, possession 
of a cell phone was used as a proxy for social capital and is associated with a 17% higher 
rate of participation; the survey region of Chiapas does not have cell phone service beyond 
the population center, so I chose not to use cell service. On the other hand, in Kenya, a 
household’s participation in other social groups was not significantly associated in the 
banana cooperativeaba, whereas the results below indicate a different result in Chiapas.  
First, in models 2/5, the presence of a household member who participates in a 
popular movement is associated with a 27% higher propensity to participate in the 
cooperative (30% for coffee growers). This effect remains high (21% for the sample and 
24$ for coffee growers) in models 3/6. These quantitative results support the qualitative 
results that the natural social capital present in Chiapas has contributed to the success of 
coffee cooperatives there (Martinez-Torres 2006). In contrast, the presence of a household 
member who participates in political activism is associated with a 13% lower propensity to 
participate in the cooperative (18%  for coffee growers). The latter result increases with the 
incorporation of village-level factors in models 3/6. The high magnitude, strong 
significance level, and opposite directions of these two results support this thesis’ 
hypothesis about mutually exclusive forms of social capital: popular movements that align 
with the Jesuit mission and NGOs in general and the hermetically sealed world of political 
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activism, like the Zapatista movement or the Mexican government, that does not admit 
other loyalties. 
In addition, walking distance to a population center significantly correlates with 
propensity to participate. Each additional hour increases the probability by 15%, and this 
result retains the same magnitude and significance in both models 2/5 and 3/6. The lack of 
market access for coffee growers in more rural areas could explain this relationship, for the 
coffee cooperative would offer a greater benefit to rural farmers. The most similar variable 
that other authors have used to walking distance was distance in km to the nearest road in 
Kenya; there too, more rural households participated at a higher rate: 15% for each km. As 
Table 1 indicates, cooperative members live half an hour farther away from a population 
center (1.5 hours versus 1 hour). Figure 8, which the subsequent section will review in more 
detail, also shows the skewed distribution of members and non-members in terms of 
walking distance to a population center. A majority of members live more than 1 hour away 
from the population center, while a majority of members live within 1 hour or less from the 
population center.  
 
4.1.3 Village Social Capital 
Model 3/6 adds village-level measures of physical and social capital. Adjusting for 
these factors, the number of courses impacts propensity to participate, conditional on the 
prior alignment of the village. Each additional course increases the propensity by 3% for the 
full sample and the coffee growers. The courses take place at the mission training center 
(colegio) in Bachajón. On the other hand, a village ejido meeting hall, which I hypothesized 
would serve as a source of information exchange, does not impact participation. Perhaps the 
presence of the mission chapel already serves this purpose.  
Of the village-level indicators, the presence of a dirt road does not significantly 
impact participation but a paved road increases it by 15% for the full sample. This result fits 
with my expectations because the coffee cooperative uses trucks to visit coffee growers 
during the growing season and to help them transport their coffee to the market at harvest 
time. The presence of a government store negatively impacts participation by 15% (18% for 
coffee growers). This strong relationship corroborates my hypothesis of multiple sources of 
social capital above. The presence of coffee-producing infrastructure also is associated with 
participation: a manual huller by 9% and an automatic huller by 41% (38% for coffee 
growers). This result calls for more investigation about the source of these hullers. In 
general, these results suggest that the coffee cooperative enhances certain types of village-
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level infrastructure, conditional on the village’s alignment toward the mission and away 
from the government.  
Overall, the first-stage results differ from existing literature on determinants of 
cooperative membership in two important ways. First, household demographic 
characteristics play a much smaller role than in the literature I have surveyed. Second, 
measures of household-level social capital and village-level physical capital, which previous 
literature has not studied, play an important role as determinants. Previous studies that 
have employed PSM to perform impact evaluation on cooperative membership indicate a 
pseudo-R2 of 0.2 to 0.4 as having a good fit on a logistic propensity score function, 
equivalent to 0.7 to 0.9 on a linear probability model (Elder, Zerriffi, and Le Billon 2012). 
Models 2/5 and 3/6 fit this criterion. Model 3/6 is my preferred specification.  
 
4.2 Cooperative Impact Evaluation Results 
The second stage of the analysis uses model (3), which employs all three sets of 
covariates: household demographic factors, household social capital measures, and village-
level physical capital measures. Figure 7 shows the common support region and Table 3 
shows the matching quality test. Both indicate that the three conditions for PSM that the 
previous section described have been met. These results reveal no effect on the per kilo 
price of coffee or income from coffee sales. As a robustness check, this stage employs three 
variations of propensity-score matching: five nearest-neighbor matching, kernel matching, 
and radius matching. Table 6 shows the results for these three variations on the ATT of the 
outcomes of interest for both the full sample and the subsample of coffee growers. The 
literature has analyzed the effect of cooperative membership on several different outcomes-- 
price per kilo, market access (fraction sold), yield, and income—so this thesis looks at the 
effect of cooperative membership on each of these outcomes in turn.   
 
4.2.1 Price Per Kilo  
I do not find a significant difference in the price that cooperative members and non-
members receive for their coffee. Depending on the method and the sample, the ATT 
estimates range from 0.22 to 0.62 pesos/kilo ($0.02 to $0.06/lb) but all lack significance. As 
a point of comparison, in Costa Rica, participants received $0.05/lb more by marketing 
their coffee through cooperatives and $0.09/lb more by marketing it through specialty 
channels; merely knowing the world market price increased the price they received by $0.03 
(Wollni and Zeller 2007).  
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In Costa Rica, the authors above found regional variation in the prices within the 
sample region. I hypothesize that the heterogeneous nature of village or zone-level coffee 
markets within the mission area from which the coffee cooperative draws its membership 
account for the lack of significance here. Local coffee buyers serve as the main competition 
for the coffee cooperative, and throughout the growing season, they adjust their prices 
based on both the international price of coffee and local factors throughout the growing 
season. On the other hand, the Batsil Maya cooperative board sets a price once a year for 
the entire region that it serves. Figure 8 supports this hypothesis of “micromarkets” within 
the survey region; the correlation between Per-Kilo price and walking distance to a 
population center shows that coffee producers in more rural villages receive a lower per kilo. 
Local buyers might possibly be offering them a lower price as a result of the “captive 
market.” Apart from the significance level, the fair trade literature review in section 2 
showed an impact on per-lb price that is an order of magnitude higher than these results: 
$0.20 to $0.60, depending on the study This impact is not reflected here.  
 
4.2.2 Market Access 
 As the literature review indicated, fair trade producers suffer from lack of market 
access, and here Batsil Maya cooperative members fares better than fair trade producers, 
who often cannot sell their entire harvest for the fair trade price. I measure market access in 
terms of the percentage of the coffee harvest that is sold on the cash market, shared within 
the community, and consumed within the household. The PSM results show a difference 
from 12 to 15% in share of coffee crop sold. Under slightly different measures, cooperative 
members sell 25 kilos more per hectare of coffee planted and receive 160 pesos more per 
hectare. With varying levels of significance, the PSM results show that cooperative 
members share 0.5% less of their coffee and consume 5% less in their household. This 
difference does not account for the entire 15% that producers sell. Nevertheless, these 
results suggest that, though cooperative members do not receive a higher per-kilo price for 
their coffee, they do experience greater market access. This fact stands out especially since 
members tend to live in more rural areas.  
Little literature about cooperatives considers the effect of membership on share of 
crop sold. As one exception, Kenyan banana farmers who participated in a collective 
marketing campaign experienced a 7% increase in the share of bananas sold (Fischer and 
Qaim 2012). Nevertheless, this lacunae in the literature suggests that further research is 
needed that considers crop share sold as a possible outcome of interest.  
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4.2.3. Income  
Along with price per-kilo, the literature also frequently examines differences 
between cooperative members and non-members in both total income and income from 
coffee sales. Examining total income allows for the possibility of substituting coffee for 
other more profitable crops and non-agricultural work for agricultural work, depending on 
local markets and individual preferences. In Ethiopia, coffee cooperative members reported 
10% higher overall income (Mojo, Fischer, and Degefa 2017). In Kenya, banana cooperative 
members reported double their income from banana sales and 25% higher overall income 
(Fischer and Qaim 2012).  In Rwanda, coffee cooperative members reported a 40% higher 
overall income (Verhofstadt and Maertens 2015).  
The PSM results for the coffee sale income received by Batsil Maya cooperative 
members show an increase relative to the mean differences. Cooperative members receive 
200 pesos more per year in the full sample or 150 pesos more per year in the coffee grower 
subsample. This difference is approximately a 20% increase in income, and is consistent 
with the previous literature above. 
On the other hand, cooperative members do not report significantly different 
incomes from non-members in other categories: agricultural income, government subsidies, 
non-agricultural income, or total income. I attribute this lack of a difference to substitution 
within types of income. For example, in the full sample, cooperative members receive less 
subsidies from the Mexican government (primarily, the Oportunidades program); on the 
other hand, since they are less likely to be female-only households and have more adult men, 
they may qualify for less subsidies. This increased household labor supply could account for 
the larger overall agricultural income reported by cooperative members, which 
encompasses sales of corn and beans as well as coffee. Nevertheless, further research is 
needed to understand the exact nature of the substitution that is taking place, especially in 
light of the significant portion of Tseltal life that does not take place on the cash economy.  
Overall, my main PSM results are that cooperative members experience increased 
market access by selling 15% more of their coffee harvest and receiving 20% more income 
from coffee sales. These results differ from other literature that has only examined the effect 
of cooperative membership on price per-kilo and overall income. In this way, they reveal the 
necessity of considering an expanded set of outcomes of interest when evaluating fair trade 
and related projects that target smallholder agricultural producers of coffee and other crops.  
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5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
This thesis examined differences between members and non-members in a coffee 
cooperative in rural Chiapas, Mexico that employs value chain integration as an alternative 
approach to fair trade certification to address the effect of price volatility of green coffee 
beans on producers’ household economies. It used propensity score matching techniques to 
examine both 1) determinants of participation in the coffee cooperative and 2) the impact of 
participation on members’ household economics.  
First, in examining the determinants of cooperative membership, it found that 
individual measures of social capital and village-level measures of capital correlate more 
highly with cooperative membership than individual-level demographic factors like age, 
landholding, education, and household size. The Chiapas context contains several sources of 
social capital: the Jesuit mission, a religious organization and NGO; the Zapatista political 
movement; and the Mexican government. The first-stage model incorporated these local 
factors. Households that participated in a popular movement were 21% more likely to 
participate in the cooperative; politically active households were 22% less likely to 
participate. Participation in each additional workshop at the Jesuit mission increased the 
probability of participation in the coffee cooperative by 3%.  
Moreover, village-level capital also impacted cooperative membership. Each 
additional hour away from the population center increased probability of participation by 
15%. The presence of a paved road, a manual coffee huller, or an automatic coffee huller 
increased the probability by 15%, 10%, and 38% respectively. Moreover, the presence of a 
DICONSA government store sponsored by the Mexican government decreased by 18% the 
probability of participation. This, the cooperative serves rural coffee producers who live in 
villages that already have the infrastructure to support coffee production and who are not 
served by the Mexican government. Overall, in contrast to previous literature on 
determinants of participation in coffee cooperatives, individual and village social capital 
impacted cooperative membership more than other demographic factors.  
Second, the PSM results indicated that cooperative members sell 15% more coffee, 
harvest 30 more kilos/hectare, and receive 200 pesos (20% more) annual income from coffee 
sales than non-members. These results stand out in light of two other outcomes of interest 
in which the PSM results do not find a difference between members and non-members. 
First, cooperative members do not receive a higher price per kilo for their coffee. I 
hypothesize that a combination of negative selection on the part of coffee cooperative 
members and heterogeneity within the coffee market of the sampling area contributes to 
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this lack of difference. Cooperative membership correlates with increased distance from a 
population center, where local coffee buyers offer a lower price than closer to the population 
center, where the cooperative may not offer a better price than other places to sell one’s 
crop. Second, cooperative members do not report increased overall income. I hypothesize 
that this lack of an increase comes from substitution within sources of income and 
unobservable heterogeneities among cooperative members and non-members.  Nevertheless, 
the lack of difference in these two outcomes of interest does not imply a lack of effect of the 
coffee cooperative on the household economies of its members. Rather, they motivate the 
use of additional measures of market access to give a more fine-grained look at producers’ 
household economies. 
In general, the first-stage and second-stage results indicate the importance of 
considering local factors when implementing development programs in a given region. No 
program operates in isolation, and no entity, whether a government organization or an 
NGO, operates outside of an existing social fabric. Any uptake of a program or successful 
effect either is helped or hindered by its context, and so contextual factors merit more 
consideration that they frequently receive in the literature. Thus future literature on coffee 
cooperatives or other programs should consider the place in the social network of both the 
organization sponsoring the cooperative and the potential beneficiaries.  
It should also consider the desires of the population that the project aims to serve. In 
the case of this cooperative, a significant part of the economic life of the indigenous Tseltal 
people operates outside of the cash economy, so increase in total income might not be the 
outcome that they desire. The history of Batsil Maya shows that when given the 
opportunity, the Tseltales do want to sell more of their coffee crop, and by measuring 
market access in terms of share of coffee sold as well as income per hectare, this thesis 
reveals the increase in market access that the cooperative offers. Moreover, given the 
possibility of negative selection into cooperative membership, this increase in market access, 
combined with a more stable price of coffee, could count as a more important outcome for 
the population that the coffee cooperative serves. At the fifteen-year anniversary of this 
coffee cooperative, given the continued volatility of the coffee market, these lessons seem as 
relevant now as ever.  
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Figure 3: Sampling Area of the Jesuit Mission of Bachajón  
(60 zones with 622 chapels) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Zones Surveyed in the Sampling Area  
(22 zones and 59 chapels) 
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Figure 5: Time to Population Center  
(Top - Full Sample; Bottom – Coffee Growers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Log of Course Count  
(Top – Full Sample; Bottom – Coffee Growers) 
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Figure 6: Log of Course Count  
(Top - Full Sample; Bottom – Coffee Growers) 
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Figure 7: Common Support (Top – Full Sample; Bottom – Coffee Growers) 
Red indicates the treatment group and black indicates the control group. 
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Figure 8:  Walking Distance to Town Center and Price Per Kilo 
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Variables Description
Demographic Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean differences
CoffeeGrower Coffee producer (1 = yes; 0 = no)
CoopMember Membership status in cooperative (1 = yes; 0 = no)
FemaleOnly Female-only household (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.016 0.124 0.217 0.412 0.201***
HHAge Age of household head (years) 45.391 14.577 39.627 14.309 -5.764***
HHMarried Marital status of household head (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.615 0.488 0.357 0.480 -0.257***
HHEdLevel Education level of household head 1.068 0.927 0.919 1.001 -0.148
 (0 = None, 1 = Primary, 2 = Secondary, 3 = Prep, 4 = University)
MaleCount Number of adult males (15 years or older) 2.099 1.356 1.286 1.088 -0.813***
Children Number of children (less than 15 years old) 1.786 2.352 1.892 2.366 0.105
LandArea Total household landholding (hectares) 7.016 12.736 7.018 9.156 0.003
Social 
dPopMovement Household participates in Popular Movement (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.323 0.469 0.088 0.283 -0.235***
dPolitical Household participates in Political Party (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.026 0.160 0.067 0.250 0.041*
lCourseCount Number of mission courses the household has participated in past year (log) 1.399 1.453 0.756 1.277 -0.643***
tPopCenter Walking distance to population center (hours) 1.533 0.638 0.993 0.698 -0.539***
Village
DirtRoad Presence of dirt road to village (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.313 0.465 0.207 0.406 -0.105**
PavedRoad Presence of paved road to village (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.047 0.212 0.092 0.290 0.045
GovStore Presence of Tienda Diconsa in village (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.109 0.313 0.350 0.478 0.241***
MeetingHall Presence of Salon Ejidal in village (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.104 0.306 0.113 0.317 0.009
ManualHuller Presence of manual coffee huller in village (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.828 0.378 0.627 0.484 -0.201***
AutoHuller Presence of automatic coffee huller in village (1 = yes; 0 = no) 0.052 0.223 0.007 0.083 -0.045***
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables of sample households by cooperative membership status
Non-members (N=434)Members (N=192)
Note: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively
Table 2: Measures of social and village capital by cooperative membership status
Variable
Absent Present Absent Present
Social
dPopMovement 526 100 414 80
dPolitical 592 34 468 26
Village
DirtRoad 476 150 374 120
PavedRoad 577 49 474 20
GovStore 453 173 375 119
MeetingHall 557 69 440 54
ManualHuller 195 431 133 361
AutoHuller 613 13 482 12
Note: See Table 1 for variable descriptions.
Full Sample
N = 626
Coffee Growers
N = 494
Table 3: Matching quality test: balancing property
Test for
Before matching Before matching
Five-nearest Kernel Radius Five-nearest Kernel Radius
Pseudo R2 0.263 0.024 0.070 0.018 0.224 0.024 0.012 0.013
LR x2 203.060 12.870 9.310 9.560 143.490 11.420 5.750 6.200
p value 0.000 0.745 0.930 0.921 0.000 0.834 0.995 0.992
Mean standardized bias 37.100 6.600 5.700 5.800 29.900 6.900 5.000 5.200
Median bias 39.900 5.500 3.900 5.900 27.300 7.000 4.800 4.600
Full sample (N = 626) Coffee grower subsample (N = 494)
After matching (algorithms) After matching (algorithms)
  
 
37 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: LPM model results of factors affecting cooperative membership
Coffee Grower Subsample (N = 494)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FemaleOnly -0.154** -0.053 0.005 -0.137* -0.046 0.014
(-3.21) (-0.82) (0.08) (-2.43) (-0.69) (0.16)
HHAge 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
(1.75) (1.66) (1.51) (1.13) (1.27) (1.00)
HHMarried 0.054 -0.018 -0.016 0.068 -0.012 -0.004
(0.83) (-0.28) (-0.35) (0.98) (-0.18) (-0.09)
HHEdLevel 0.038 0.022 0.021 0.048 0.030 0.030
(1.54) (1.04) (1.07) (1.77) (1.36) (1.27)
MaleCount 0.062** 0.041 0.038* 0.053* 0.033 0.029
(2.71) (1.84) (2.06) (2.38) (1.48) (1.40)
Children -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005
(-0.76) (-0.57) (-0.48) (-0.83) (-0.68) (-0.61)
LandArea 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.63) (0.70) (1.26) (0.42) (0.52) (0.80)
dPopMovement 0.267** 0.207*** 0.299** 0.236***
(2.84) (4.18) (3.29) (4.04)
dPolitical -0.125 -0.175* -0.183* -0.218*
(-1.17) (-2.34) (-2.14) (-2.39)
lCourseCount 0.024 0.034* 0.022 0.032*
(1.49) (2.55) (1.36) (2.17)
tPopCenter 0.148** 0.145*** 0.157** 0.156***
(2.79) (5.31) (2.87) (5.08)
DirtRoad 0.081 0.096
(1.87) (1.90)
PavedRoad 0.140* 0.152
(2.09) (1.45)
GovStore -0.146*** -0.182***
(-3.63) (-3.79)
MeetingHall 0.018 0.048
(0.31) (0.73)
ManualHuller 0.094* 0.095*
(2.38) (1.98)
AutoHuller 0.405*** 0.380**
(3.46) (2.94)
_cons 0.009 -0.135 -0.152 0.071 -0.111 -0.130
(0.10) (-1.32) (-1.85) (0.67) (-0.98) (-1.31)
R2 0.125 0.226 0.272 0.078 0.197 0.250
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** refer to p-values at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Full Sample (N = 626)
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables of sample households by cooperative membership status
Variables Description Mean differences
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Coffee Harvest
PerKilo Price Per Kilo from Coffee Sale (in MXN) 2.785 3.954 3.157 6.688 0.372
CoffeeSoldFraction Fraction of Coffee Harvest Sold 73.950 41.800 52.405 47.400 -21.54***
CoffeeSharedFraction Fraction of Coffee Harvest Shared 0.645 1.896 1.974 8.676 1.329*
CoffeeConsumeFraction Fraction of Coffee Harvest Consumed 8.770 23.135 8.486 22.255 -0.284
YieldByHA Coffee Yield (Kilos) Per Hectare 108.886 136.126 80.066 147.312 -28.82*
SaleByHA Coffee Sale (MXN) Per Hectare 343.031 526.946 200.478 330.325 -142.6***
Income
AgIncome Total Agricultural Income (MXN) 2751.563 7999.620 1851.382 8115.890 -900.2
CoffeeSaleIncome Income from Coffee Sales (MXN) 590.104 799.317 445.853 771.336 -144.3*
GovIncome Income from Government Programs (MXN) 2634.896 4483.032 2962.903 4417.902 328.0
ExtraIncome Total Non-Agricultural Income (MXN) 506.771 2087.687 468.433 1664.490 -38.34
Income Total Income (Sum of Four Variables) 5893.229 9153.634 5282.719 9695.908 -610.5
Members Non-members
N = 192 N = 434
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Table 6: Propensity score matching results
Coffee grower subsample (N = 494)
Outcomes Five-nearest Radius Kernel Five-nearest Radius Kernel
Coffee Harvest
PerKilo (pesos / kilo) 0.615 0.469 0.464 0.453 0.307 0.220
CoffeeSoldFraction (% of harvest) 15.286*** 14.134*** 14.145*** 12.503** 13.094** 12.428***
CoffeeSharedFraction (% of harvest) -0.694 -0.942*** -0.915** -0.567 -0.783 -0.810*
CoffeeConsumeFraction (% of harvest) -5.189 -5.217* -5.371* -3.402 -4.104 -4.426
YieldByHA (kilos / hectare) 30.865** 29.043** 28.426** 20.036 23.304** 24.069
SaleByHA (pesos / hectare) 166.513*** 165.046*** 163.189*** 155.26*** 160.669*** 162.077***
Income
AgIncome (pesos per year) 1173.125 773.383 813.722 718.497 484.851 516.341
CoffeeSaleIncome (pesos per year) 207.500** 196.493** 191.33** 149.711** 180.841** 180.053*
GovIncome (pesos per year) -291.458 -137.991 -128.923 101.272 65.738 39.637
ExtraIncome (pesos per year) 82.500 105.370 101.067 102.196 75.293 70.146
Income (pesos per year) 964.167 740.762 785.866 921.965 625.882 626.125
Note: ATT estimates of five-nearest neighbors, kernel (bandwidth = 0.06), and radius (caliper = 0.05) are estimated using
the "psmatch2" command in Stata. The standard errors are estimated using bootstrap with 100 replications.
Full sample (N = 626)
